Rexagames.com.rar

| Phase | Tools & Techniques | Description | |-------|--------------------|-------------| | | hashdeep , 7‑Zip , WinRAR | Compute SHA‑256 / MD5 hashes of the original RAR file; verify integrity. | | 4.2. Static Inspection | binwalk , pefile , strings , exiftool , YARA , VirusTotal | List all archived items, extract them to a safe directory, run YARA rules, check for known packers (e.g., UPX, MPRESS). | | 4.3. Sandbox Execution | Cuckoo Sandbox , FireEye HX , Process Monitor (Procmon) , Wireshark | Execute each executable/script in an isolated VM; capture system calls, file modifications, network connections, and API usage. | | 4.4. Threat Intel Correlation | MISP , OTX , AlienVault , VirusTotal Intelligence | Search for hash matches, domain/IP reputation, and related campaign indicators. | | 4.5. Reporting | Markdown / Word template | Document findings, evidence, and recommendations. |

| # | Artifact | Type | SHA‑256 | YARA Hits | Notable Strings / Indicators | Initial Verdict | |---|----------|------|----------|-----------|------------------------------|-----------------| | 1 | setup.exe | PE32 executable | xxxx… | 3 (packed, suspicious API) | “/usr/local/bin/…”, “http://malicious‑cdn.com/payload” | – packed, network call | | 2 | readme.txt | Text | xxxx… | — | “Contact support at support@rexagames.com” | Benign – likely decoy | | 3 | config.cfg | INI | xxxx… | — | “C2=185.23.7.112:8080” | High risk – hard‑coded C2 | | 4 | lib.dll | PE32 DLL | xxxx… | 2 (cryptographic API) | “CryptEncrypt”, “RtlMoveMemory” | Potentially malicious | | 5 | script.vbs | VBScript | xxxx… | — | “CreateObject(“WScript.Shell”).Run” | Malicious – command execution | rexagames.com.rar

Replace placeholder values with actual data after analysis. | Phase | Tools & Techniques | Description

The preliminary static analysis indicates that rexagames.com.rar contains multiple artifacts that are highly likely to be malicious. Immediate containment actions combined with a thorough dynamic investigation are required to fully understand the payload’s capabilities and to mitigate any potential compromise. The findings and recommendations outlined above should be reviewed by the relevant stakeholders and acted upon according to the organization’s incident‑response procedures. Threat Intel Correlation | MISP , OTX ,