Bfpass Instant

Because BFPASS does not store raw biometrics, revoking a compromised key is possible: the server simply deletes ((pub, C)) for that user. The user re-enrolls with the but a new random secret (s) and new helper string (pub'). This breaks the non-revocability curse of traditional biometrics.

Crucially, the server never sees (\phi(B_i)) or (s_i'). Instead, the client sends a : [ \pi_i = \textZKP (s_i', \phi(B_i)) : Rep(\phi(B_i), pub) = s_i' \land \textVerify(s_i', C) = 1 ] The server verifies (\pi_i) in milliseconds without learning any biometric data. bfpass

[1] Y. Dodis, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith. "Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data." Eurocrypt 2008 . Because BFPASS does not store raw biometrics, revoking